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The Right Solution to the Wrong Problem:
The Status of Controlling Shareholders After
In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc.
INTRODUCTION
In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc.' (Hammons), a recent Delaware Chancery
Court decision, announced new requirements that corporations with
controlling shareholders must meet to ensure deferential "business judgment"
review of acquisitions by third-party acquirors. Now these corporations must
secure the "(1) recommend[ation of] a disinterested and independent special
committee, and (2) approv[al] by stockholders in a non-waivable vote of the
majority of all the minority stockholders."' If both of these prerequisites are
not met, the exacting "entire fairness" standard of review will govern. Because
the standard of review often determines the outcome of litigation, corporations
with controlling shareholders will now have little choice but to follow the
procedures set forth by the Hammons court.'
1. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 758-CC, 20o9 WL
3165613 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
2. Id. at *12.
3. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) ("'[B]ecause
the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the
standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of
judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation."' (quoting
AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986))). A further
effect of applying entire fairness review is that courts cannot dismiss claims at the pleadings
stage. This means that all claims will have some settlement value, regardless of merit. For a
discussion of the inefficiencies associated with using entire fairness review as a default, see
In re Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine,
V.C.).
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This Comment argues that the Hammons decision places unwarranted and
costly procedural prerequisites on corporations with controlling shareholders.
Part I summarizes the facts of Hammons and analyzes the legal rule
promulgated by the decision. Part II argues that the Hammons ruling
represents a departure from prior Delaware doctrine that suggested that, in the
third-party merger context, approval by either a special committee or a majority
of minority shareholders would trigger deferential business judgment review.
Part III situates the Hammons decision within the current debate over the
standard of review for control transactions. Many commentators have urged
adoption of the Hammons rule in the freezeout context - that is, for
transactions in which a controlling shareholder acquires the minority stake in a
corporation.4 Part III argues that Chancellor William Chandler misapplied this
reform proposal to a third-party merger in Hammons, which does not pose the
same concerns as those associated with a freezeout transaction.
I. FACTS OF HAMMONS
In Hammons, Chancellor Chandler reviewed the merger of John Q.
Hammons Hotels Inc. (JQH) into a corporation indirectly owned by Jonathan
Eilian, an independent third-party acquiror. JQH was controlled by John
Hammons, the company's founder.' In early 2004, Hammons told the board of
JQH that he was contemplating a sale of the company. The board responded
by forming a special committee to evaluate the fairness of potential
transactions to minority shareholders and to engage in negotiations on their
behalf. The special committee evaluated a number of offers and ultimately
approved the merger between JQH and Eilian.' The merger agreement was
4. By contrast, in a third-party merger, an unrelated acquiror obtains control of the
corporation.
5. Hammons held 76% of the voting power in JQH. He owned oo% ownership of JQH Class
B common stock, which was entitled to fifty votes per share, and 5% of JQH Class A stock,
which was entitled to a single vote per share. Hammons, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2.
6. It is important to note that Hammons received disparate consideration for his Class B
shares. This may have been influential in Chancellor Chandler's decision to invoke entire
fairness review. The terms of the JQH merger provided that holders of Class A stock would
receive $24 per share. This was a significant premium to the market share price, which had
been in the $4 to $7 range before rumors of a potential merger began circulating.
Hammons's Class B stock was to be converted into a 2% interest in a limited partnership
through which JQH conducted its operations. Hammons also received a $328 million
liquidation preference for his preexisting interest in the partnership and a number of
benefits negotiated in separate transaction agreements. The company's investment bank,
1252
120:1251 2011
THE RIGHT SOLUTION TO THE WRONG PROBLEM
conditioned upon a majority of disinterested stockholders approving the
transaction; however, this prerequisite could be waived upon the vote of the
special committee.'
At the outset of his opinion, Chancellor Chandler discussed which standard
of review should apply. In Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.,8 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the exclusive standard of judicial review for
freezeout mergers is entire fairness.9 Chancellor Chandler distinguished the
JQH merger from a freezeout merger, stating that "[u]nlike in Lynch, the
controlling stockholder . . . did not make the offer to the minority
stockholders; an unrelated third-party did."'o Because Hammons did not stand
"on both sides of the transaction,"" entire fairness review was not mandated.
Chancellor Chandler nevertheless decided to apply entire fairness review
due to the potential for abuse of minority shareholders. Chancellor Chandler
reasoned that entire fairness should apply because:
Hammons and the minority stockholders were in a sense 'competing'
for portions of the consideration Eilian was willing to pay[, and]
Hammons, as a result of his controlling position, could effectively veto
any transaction. In such a case it is paramount- indeed, necessary in
order to invoke business judgment review - that there be robust
procedural protections in place to ensure that the minority stockholders
have sufficient bargaining power and the ability to make an informed
choice of whether to accept the third-party's offer for their shares."
Chancellor Chandler then stated that a "recommend[ation] by a disinterested
and independent special committee, and . . . approv[al] by stockholders in a
non-waivable vote of the majority of all the minority stockholders"" would
provide sufficient procedural protections for minority shareholders, and thus
the satisfaction of both of these conditions would result in the application of
the business judgment rule. In the JQH merger, however, the majority-of-the-
minority condition only required receipt of a majority of the disinterested
Lehman Brothers, calculated the value of the consideration paid for the Class B shares to be
between $11.95 and $14.74 per share. See id. at *7.
7. Id.
8. 638 A.2d ilio (Del. 1994).
9. Id. at 1117.
io. Hammons, 2009 WL 3165613, at *io.
ii. Id. (quoting Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117).
12. Id. at *12.
13. Id.
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shares actually voting and could be waived by the special committee. Thus,
Chancellor Chandler held that entire fairness review applied."
II. THE HAMMONS DECISION CONFLICTED WITH PRIOR DOCTRINE
Delaware courts typically apply the deferential business judgment rule
when reviewing corporate decisions. In situations involving a potential conflict
of interest, however, they will employ the more stringent entire fairness
standard." Change-of-control transactions involving companies with
controlling shareholders give rise to possible conflicts of interest." As such, in
some circumstances, the judiciary has required procedural protections for
minority shareholders or has engaged in more exacting review of these
transactions. Judges have recognized that freezeouts present special concerns of
potential minority abuse because, in freezeout transactions, a controlling
shareholder liquidates the minority position in order to gain total control of the
corporation. Consequently, the judiciary has required heightened procedural
safeguards in freezeout transactions. The Hammons decision extended these
requirements to third-party mergers, which do not present the same concerns
as those associated with freezeouts, thereby promulgating a new set of costly
and unnecessary procedures that companies with a controlling shareholder
must follow in order to engage in a merger.
14. When the JQH transaction was actually put to a vote, 72% of the outstanding Class A
shares -89% of those that voted -supported the merger. The Hainmons opinion, however,
dismisses the importance of the minority shareholders' ex post ratification, saying only that
the majority-of-the-minority clause provides "stockholders [with] an important
opportunity to approve or disapprove of the work of the special committee and to stop a
transaction they believe is not in their best interests." Id. The opinion did not discuss why a
determination by minority stockholders that the transaction was in their best interest did
not remove the taint of self-interest.
15. Under the entire fairness standard of review, the burden is initially on the defendant to
show fair dealing and fair price. This burden can be shifted to the challenging shareholder if
either a special committee or a majority of minority shareholders approves the transaction.
See id. at *14 n.48. The choice of which standard of review governs a transaction is crucial
because, in practice, it often determines the outcome of litigation. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text. Application of the business judgment rule will likely result in victory for
the corporate fiduciaries, whereas entire fairness review will almost assure their defeat. See
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989).
16. See, e.g., 1 Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED AcQusIf1ONs OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04 (2009).
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A. Divergence in the Delaware Freezeout Jurisprudence
A brief examination of the evolution of Delaware law governing freezeout
transactions is necessary to contextualize the Hammons decision. The hallmark
of a freezeout transaction is that the controlling shareholder stands on both
sides of the deal- making the offer to buy the company and accepting it on the
corporation's behalf. The primary concern that arises in such a situation is that
there is no opportunity for arm's-length bargaining, and consequently, the
controlling shareholder may cash out the minority at an unfair price. To
combat this potential problem, Delaware courts engage in a more exacting
review of these transactions, requiring certain additional procedural
protections to be in place in order for the standard of review to be lowered or
the burden of proof to be shifted.
Delaware jurisprudence has drawn a formalistic distinction between
freezeouts accomplished via merger and those pursued through a tender offer,
even though they are economically similar transactions. In Lynch, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the exclusive standard of judicial review for freezeout
mergers is entire fairness.17 The burden of proving fairness initially lies with
the controlling shareholder; however, it may be shifted to the challenging
shareholders by securing "approval of [either] an independent committee of
directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders."" However, even
if the burden shifts, entire fairness review continues to apply.'9 By contrast, in
In re Pure Resources, Inc.,2o the Delaware Chancery Court held that the business
judgment rule applies to freezeout tender offers so long as three procedural
protections are in place: (1) a nonwaivable condition that a majority of the
minority shareholders tender into the offer, (2) a promise from the controlling
shareholder to consummate a short-form merger upon receipt of 90% of
outstanding shares, and (3) the absence of retributive threats against the
minority.1
17. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994). For an argument against
the Lynch decision, see infra Part III.
18. 638 A.2d at 1117.
ig. The Lynch decision clarified a previously ambiguous area of Delaware law and opted to
apply what many commentators believe is an overly stringent standard for freezeout
transactions. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Preeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-12 (2007) (arguing that corporations are more likely to form a special
committee because it is less onerous than obtaining approval from a majority of the
minority and there is no added benefit from the latter course of action).
z. In re Pure Resources, Inc. S'holders Litig., 8o8 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
zi. See id. at 445.
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B. The Legal Distinction Between Freezeouts and Third-Party Mergers
While the Lynch decision mandates entire fairness review for freezeout
mergers, it does not preclude application of the business judgment rule to
mergers in which a controlling shareholder only has an interest in one side of
the transaction, such as the merger at issue in Hammons." This distinction
accords with Delaware law governing the fiduciary obligations of controlling
shareholders. In order to invoke entire fairness review for a breach of a
controlling shareholder's fiduciary obligation, a challenger must show that the
controlling shareholder engaged in self-dealing." The Delaware courts have
stated that "[t]raditionally, the term 'self-dealing' describes the 'situation when
a [corporate fiduciary] is on both sides of a transaction."' Thus, in the context
of a freezeout merger, a controlling shareholder may be accused of self-dealing,
whereas in a third-party merger she may not.2
This principle was affirmed in In re Compucom Systems, Inc. ,26 when Vice
Chancellor Stephen Lamb applied the business judgment rule to review the
sale of Compucom, a company with a controlling shareholder, to Platinum, a
third-party acquiror. 7 In determining which standard of review to apply, Vice
Chancellor Lamb stated:
22. As noted above, in Haommons Chancellor Chandler held that Lynch did not control. See supra
text accompanying note o.
23. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("[Entire fairness review]
will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing-the situation
when a parent is on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary."); 18A AM. JUR. 2D
Corporations § 654 (2009) ("The invocation of the intrinsic-fairness standard is predicated
upon the existence of two factors: (1) majority control and domination; and (2) majority
self-dealing.").
24. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d n156, 1169 (Del. 1995) (quoting Sinclair, 28o
A.2d at 720).
25. The American Law Institute has affirmed the distinction between freezeout transactions and
third-party mergers, noting that "'[i f the controlling shareholder will have no significant
equity interest in the corporation's business after consummation of the transaction . . . , then
no review for fairness is required." 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 5.15 cmt c.(1)(a) (2oo5).
26. In re Compucom Systems, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 499-N, 2005 WL 2481325 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 29, 2005).
27. In In re Compucoi Systems, Inc., the minority shareholders were represented by a special
committee; however, the merger was not conditioned on approval by a majority of the
minority stockholders. Therefore, according to the new Hammons framework, it should
have been reviewed under the entire fairness standard.
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Generally speaking, a controlling shareholder has the right to sell
his control share without regard to the interests of any minority
shareholder, so long as the transaction is undertaken in good faith. The
same has long been true as a general proposition when a parent chooses to
negotiate for the sale ofa subsidiary corporation to an independent third party.
The reasons for the law's tolerance of such sales is clear -as the owner
of a majority share, the controlling shareholder's interest in maximizing
value is directly aligned with that of the minority.,8
As this decision highlights, the presence of a controlling shareholder alone does
not necessitate application of entire fairness review.
Challenging shareholders may still invoke entire fairness review in the
third-party merger context by alleging that the controlling shareholder has
created a conflict of interest for the board. 9 In order to prove such a breach,
the challengers must show that the board was "dominated by the controlling
shareholder, and [that] this domination led the board to accommodate the
controller rather than act in the best interest of all the subsidiary's
shareholders."3 o If a conflict of interest is alleged directly against the board,
however, "approval by a special committee of independent directors or an
informed majority-of-the-minority vote, [will] justify review under the
business judgment rule."" Thus, contrary to the decision in Hammons, prior
precedent suggests that the business judgment rule should apply to third-party
mergers if either a special committee or a majority of the minority approved the
transaction, but not both.
28. Compucom, 2005 WL 2481325, at *6 (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000).
30. Compucom, 2005 WL 2481325, at *6. In Hammons, this was not the case. Chancellor
Chandler noted that the minority shareholders were "represented by [a] disinterested and
independent special committee." In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil
Action No. 758-CC, 2oo9 WL 3165613, at *io (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). In applying the entire
fairness standard the Chancellor instead relied on deficiencies in the majority-of-the
minority voting provisions. Id. at *12.
31. In re PNB Holding Co. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 28-N, 20o6 WL 2403999, at *i (Del. Ch.
Aug. 18, 2006); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2009) (discussing corporate
transactions involving interested directors). But see Blake Rohrbacher, John Mark
Zeberkiewicz & Thomas A. Uebler, Finding Safe Harbor: Clarjfying the Limited Application of
Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 737-41 (2008) (arguing that application of section 144
should be limited to questions of voidability).
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III.THEORETICAL CONCERNS RAISED BY TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
A CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER
The doctrinal distinction between freezeout transactions and third-party
mergers is rooted in the different theoretical concerns they raise. In a freezeout
transaction, presence of the controlling shareholder on both sides of the
transaction creates a heightened risk of opportunistic behavior in a number of
circumstances. First, the controlling shareholder may use insider information
to time the freezeout at a point when the stock price is depressed below
intrinsic value." Second, and more troublesome from an efficiency perspective,
the controlling shareholder may wield its influence over the corporation to
drive down the value of shares by, for example, putting off potentially
profitable projects or even engaging in negative net present value projects."
Both of these concerns arise because, in a freezeout, the controlling shareholder
retains an interest in the surviving corporation while the minority is cashed out
based on the share price of the target corporation. This means that the
controlling shareholder can privately appropriate the minority's share after the
freezeout is completed by cashing out the minority at a depressed price.
Unlike freezeouts, third-party mergers do not give control of the surviving
corporation to the controlling shareholder. Because the controlling shareholder
will be cashed out along with the minority, the concerns about price
manipulation that arise in the freezeout context are absent. The controlling
shareholder does not have an incentive to depress share price or to put off
profitable projects because she will not be able to privately appropriate these
gains in the future. Instead, the primary concern that arises in a third-party
merger is that the controlling shareholder will attempt to structure the merger
in a way that provides her with excess consideration at the expense of the
minority shareholders. 4
The facts of Hammnons provide an illustration of this concern. Because
Hammons involved a dual-class capitalization, the calculus determining the
allocation of consideration between Class A and Class B stock was
appropriately described as a zero-sum game. As Chancellor Chandler noted,
Hammons and the minority shareholders were competing for the consideration
that Eilian was willing to pay. While this is a substantial threat for minority
32. See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31-32 (2005).
33. Id. at 32-34. The controlling shareholder will engage in negative net present value projects to
the extent that the benefit accorded from the lower share price exceeds the controller's share
of the cost of the project.
34. Although payment of a control premium is permissible, it should not come at the expense of
the fair market value of the minority shares.
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shareholders, it pales in comparison to the conflicts that arise in a freezeout."
In a third-party merger, the consideration being paid out is transparent, and
courts must only assess the fairness of the payment to the controlling
shareholder in relation to the minority.36 By contrast, in a freezeout, the value
being received by the controlling shareholder is opaque, and courts must
attempt to determine whether the minority is being cashed out at a fair price. A
further distinction is that, whereas in a freezeout the controlling shareholder is
both setting the price and accepting the offer, in a third-party merger she is a
price taker reacting to an offer from an independent acquiror. Thus, the
concerns about structuring the transaction to benefit the controlling
shareholder at the expense of the minority are greatly mitigated.
Because of the theoretical distinctions between freezeouts and other final-
period transactions, in the absence of freezeout concerns, Delaware courts have
historically been willing to treat transactions involving different classes of
stockholders "competing" for portions of consideration as an ordinary conflict
of interest for directors. In In re PNB Holding Co.,7 the Delaware Chancery
Court reviewed a board decision to cash out all but the sixty-eight largest
stockholders of the company." In reviewing the conversion, Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine noted that the board was subject to a major conflict of interest: "By
deciding to embark on the Merger, the PNB directors created a zero-sum game.
Each of them . . . stood to gain by paying as little as possible to the departing
PNB stockholders."" The reason for this is that whatever value was kept in the
company would be shared by the owners of the surviving corporation -which,
in this case, was largely comprised of PNB's board of directors. Chancellor
Strine stated that,
In this conflicted situation, the PNB directors are bound to show that
the Merger was fair to the departing stockholders or to point to the
3s. Traditionally, Delaware courts have addressed the threat posed by minority shareholders
competing for consideration by requiring procedural safeguards such as approval of either a
special committee or a majority of the minority, in order to secure business judgment
review. See, e.g., PNB Holding, 20o6 WL 2403999.
36. To this end, courts require a fairness opinion for the consideration being paid to the
controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders, as well as a fairness opinion of the
payments in relation to one another. See In re Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No.
Civ.A. 16470, 2005 WL 3642727 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005).
37. 20o6 WL 2403999.
38. The directors and officers owned 33.5% of PNB's outstanding shares, and all of them were
expected to be among the sixty-eight largest stockholders. Therefore they would have an
interest in the new corporation.
39. PNB Holding, 20o6 WL 2403999, at *i.
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presence of a cleansing device, such as approval by a special committee of
independent directors or an informed majority-of-the-minority vote, in order
to justify review under the business judgment rule. 4o
As this holding illustrates, when different classes of shareholders compete for
consideration, the classic cleansing devices- approval of either a special
committee or a majority of the minority vote -provide sufficient protection for
minority shareholders to justify invocation of the business judgment rule.4
CONCLUSION
The Hammons decision has deepened a preexisting doctrinal schism over
what procedural safeguards are necessary to protect minority shareholders in
final-period transactions. As Part II described, the evolution of Delaware
doctrine in the freezeout context has resulted in divergent treatment for
controlling shareholders who cash out the minority in a merger and those who
wrest control via tender offer. Commentators have argued that the current
doctrinal system is inefficient and have advocated for convergence in judicial
review of all freezeout transactions. More specifically, academics and
practitioners alike have urged the Delaware Supreme Court to overrule Lynch
and apply the business judgment rule to freezeout transactions that are
approved by both a special committee and a majority of minority
shareholders -the rule adopted in Hammons.4 ' This proposal would bring
consistency to the law governing freezeout transactions and require an
optimally efficient level of procedural safeguards for minority shareholders."
In the Hammons opinion, Chancellor Chandler stated that he was
"cognizant of recent suggestions of ways to 'harmonize' the standards applied
to transactions that differ in form but have the effect of cashing out minority
stockholders."" As noted above, however, critics have called for harmonization
in the context of freezeout transactions, not third-party mergers such as the
40. Id. (emphasis added); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2009) (discussing corporate
transactions involving interested directors).
41. Arguably, the facts of PNB Holding presented a greater threat to minority shareholders than
a third-party merger because the directors had a continuing stake in the surviving
corporation and thus had incentives to manipulate the market price.
42. See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 643-44 (Del. Ch. 2005);
Subramanian, snpra note 32.
43. See Subramanian, supra note 32, at 49-64.
44. In re John Q Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 7 58-CC, 2009 WL
3165613, at *12 n-37 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
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one at issue in Hammons. The Hammons decision thus represents the right
reform applied in the wrong context and has the effect of further complicating
an already opaque doctrine. Under Delaware law, the presence of a controlling
shareholder alone has, until now, been insufficient to trigger entire fairness
review. Instead, it is the presence of the controlling shareholder on both sides
of a freezeout transaction that has resulted in increased judicial scrutiny. In a
third-party acquisition such as the Hammons merger, the controlling
shareholder is cashed out along with the minority, and many of the concerns
that arise in the freezeout context are avoided. Indeed, the risk of minority
manipulation that is present in a third-party merger mirrors the concerns that
arise in classic director-conflict transactions and may be allayed by the same
procedural protections that are put in place for those transactions.
In light of this theoretical framework, the Hammons decision's break from
doctrine is unwarranted. Hammons requires an inefficient level of procedural
safeguards in order to engage in third-party mergers, thereby potentially
deterring socially beneficial transactions. Although the decision could be
viewed as an attempt to harmonize the confused judicial doctrine governing
mergers and acquisitions of controlled corporations, by dragging third-party
mergers into a debate that previously focused on freezeouts, the court has
unfortunately taken a step in the wrong direction.
BENJAMIN KLEIN
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